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Abstract
This article explores a previously unknown twelfth-century debate surrounding Avi-
cenna’s theory of matter, in particular his views that, being deprived of actuality, prime
matter is non-corporeal, and that body is investedwith corporeity by a substantial form
impressed into matter known as corporeal form. Avicenna’s main proof of prime mat-
ter from body’s susceptibility to division was targeted earlier in the century by Abū
l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī, but was later reinterpreted and
developed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who brought this particular debate to a close. The
problem, however, persisted as a puzzle that exercised later Arabic philosophers.
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The principal aim of this article is to explore a previously unknown debate
surroundingAvicenna’s theory ofmatter, inparticular his views that primemat-
ter is deprived of all actuality, and correspondingly that corporeity is not an
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inherent characteristic of prime matter, but is instead invested to matter by a
substantial form impressed into it known as corporeal form.1 The debate, as we
shall see, centred on Avicenna’s main proof of prime matter, which was con-
futed in the 6th/12th century by Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. ca. 560/1165) and
in his footsteps Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī (fl. Bukhara, 582/1186), before being
rethought and developed in the last quarter of the century by Fakhr al-Dīn
al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). Al-Rāzī’s robust and innovative defence brought this par-
ticular debate to a close; however the problem persisted as a serious puzzle
that continued to exercise later Arabic philosophers. We shall focus here on
three key episodes: the different versions of Avicenna’s proof of prime matter;
al-Masʿūdī’s criticism of the Ishārāt version of the proof, and its background in
Abū l-Barakāt; and al-Rāzī’s response to al-Masʿūdī’s criticism.
As a secondary aim, light will be shed on the broader philosophical setting
within which this debate was played out. Above all, we are afforded a glimpse
of the genesis of the exegetical tradition on Avicenna’s Ishārāt, represented by
our two central sources, which hitherto have remained unstudied. The first is
al-Masʿūdī’s al-Mabāḥithwa-l-Shukūk ʿalā l-Ishārāt, consisting of a collection of
objections (shakk) on various discussions in the Physics andMetaphysics of the
Ishārāt, and as such is the first substantial commentary in the long tradition
of commentaries on this Avicennan work. As I showed in a previous study,
al-Masʿūdī’s criticism of Avicenna exhibits the influence of both Abū l-Barakāt
and al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111).2 We shall concentrate here on the first section (or
problem, masʾala) in the Shukūk, which targets a ‘pointer’ (ishāra, by which
Avicennameans ‘a proof’) from the beginning of the Physics that demonstrates
that body consists of the combination of prime matter and corporeal form.3
Our second main source is a dedicated response, titled Jawābāt al-masāʾil
al-bukhāriyya (Response to the [Philosophical] Problems fromBukhara), written
by al-Rāzī as a rejoinder to al-Masʿūdī’s work. The two contemporaries were
well-acquainted with one another and engaged in face-to-face debates, though
this response appears to have beenwritten before the two firstmet inBukhara.4
1 The theory of corporeal formwas introduced by Simplicius to resolve a contradiction in Aris-
totle’s views on first matter, namely that in some passages he describes it as corporeal and
extended, and in other passages as incorporeal and unextended. On this see Stone, “Simpli-
cius and Avicenna”; Hyman, “Aristotle’s ‘First Matter,’ ” 335–44; Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique of
Aristotle, 99 ff.; 579ff.
2 On al-Masʿūdī and his work, see Shihadeh, “From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī,” 153 ff.
3 Al-Masʿūdī, Shukūk, fols. 109b–111a.
4 Shihadeh, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Response,” 2–3. On their meetings and debates, see Shi-
hadeh, “From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī,” 157 ff.
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In the corresponding first section, al-Rāzī responds to al-Masʿūdī’s criticism,
but implicitly recognises the shortcomings ofAvicenna’s proof, and accordingly
proposes his own new version thereof.5 The Jawābāt is al-Rāzī’s earliest extant
philosophicalwork, andhencepredates hiswell-known Sharḥ, the first ever full
commentary on the Ishārāt; and although the Sharḥnevermentions al-Masʿūdī
by name, its commentary on the ishāra in question prominently features both
his objection and the author’s response. Through the Sharḥ and al-Rāzī’s other,
independent philosophical works, his developed version of Avicenna’s proof
was influential on later philosophers, including al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), who also
had access to the Jawābāt.6
Before turning to Avicenna’s proof and the ensuing debate, we need, first of
all, to set the scene by providing an outline of the most relevant aspects of his
account of matter and body and of the competing theory expounded by Abū
l-Barakāt.
1 Two Theories of Matter: Avicenna versus Abū l-Barakāt
‘Body’ ( jism), according to Avicenna, is said of different things. ‘Natural body’
( jism ṭabīʿī) denotes the substance in which we can postulate three dimen-
sions (buʿd, imtidād), perpendicular to one another (length, width and depth).7
These three dimensions need only be postulated; Avicenna is careful to empha-
sise that body, in this sense of substantive corporeity ( jismiyya), need not have
actual lines or surfaces, as these would be accidental, rather than essential
characteristics of body. For this reason, it seems, the foregoing definition is in
one place said to be merely a description (rasm), as opposed to a real defini-
tion (ḥadd).8 A real definition must only consist of characteristics essential to
what it defines, yet being actually characterised by, or susceptible to, certain
accidents cannot be an essential characteristic of body. In one place, however,
Avicenna identifies “true corporeity” as “the form of continuity, which receives
the positing of the three dimensions which we have mentioned.”9 ‘Continuity’
(ittiṣāl) here is intended in the absolute sense of divisibility, as opposed to the
5 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 12–20. The corresponding discussion in al-Rāzī’s full commentary, the Sharḥ
al-Ishārāt, is examined in my “Al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ.”
6 Al-Ṭūsī refers to al-Masʿūdī and al-Rāzī’s Jawābāt in three places (Ḥall, 2, 189; 2, 354; 2,
366).
7 Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.2, 13; Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 61–3; Ḥudūd, 22.
8 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 63. On this, see al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 5–6.
9 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 64; cf. Stone, “Simplicius and Avicenna,” 101–2.
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other, relative senses of the expression.10 A thing is said to be continuous in
itself if it is possible to posit divisions within it, such that any two posited divi-
sions would share a common boundary.11 Thus defined, substantial corporeity
is common to all determinate bodies, no individual body having more or less
of it than another.12
Necessarily associated with corporeity are several concomitants (lāzim,
lāḥiq), which are accidental rather than essential to it and do not contribute
to the realisation (taḥaqquq) and subsistence (qiwām) thereof, as we may fully
conceive of corporeity as such without conceiving of any of its concomitants.13
One such concomitant is finitude, whose concomitance to body owes to the
fact that determinate bodies are made up of limited parcels of matter.14 From
finitude follow further concomitants, in particular determinate dimensions,
boundaries, surface and shape.15 The totality of these accidental concomitants
of a given determinate body are accidents of magnitude (kammiyya) that con-
stitute what is known as ‘mathematical body’ ( jism taʿlīmī), which is a non-
substantial form inhering in a corporeal substance.16 Being accidental, mag-
nitude is never inherently necessary, although some bodies, such as celestial
spheres, may have permanentmagnitudes due to a nature external to their cor-
poreity and specific dimensions.17
The two principles of natural body, that is to say the proximate causes
to which it owes its subsistence, are prime matter and corporeal form (ṣūra
jismiyya).18 The principal difference between matter and form, qua principles,
10 ‘Continuity’ is given three definitions, the first two being relative: (1) contiguity, that is,
when two bodies share a common boundary, i.e. when their surfaces are in contact; (2)
attachment, that is, when the two bodies are attached to each other, either by adhesion
or interconnection; and (3) divisibility (Avicenna,Manṭiq, ii.III.4, 116–17; Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.iii.2,
269–71; cf. Stone, “Simplicius and Avicenna,” 102).
11 The definition of absolute continuity as divisibility is adapted from Aristotle. Avicenna
reports that, in the Categories, Aristotle defines continuity as “that for whose divisions it
is possible that there be a common boundary at which they are joined” (Risāla ilā l-Wazīr
Abī Saʿd, 42–4; cf. Aristotle, Qāṭīghūriyās, 328–9; idem, Categories, 4b22–5a14).
12 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 64; 71; Manṭiq, ii.III.4, 113–14; Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.1, 13; Ishārāt, 2, 174; 2,
243–4.
13 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 62.
14 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 62; Manṭiq, ii.III.4, 113; Ishārāt, 2, 191–5; 2, 227; Risāla ilā l-Wazīr
Abī Saʿd, 8 ff.
15 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 62; Ishārāt, 2, 191; 2, 243–4; 2, 227.
16 Avicenna, Manṭiq, ii.III.4, 115; Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 64–5.
17 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 64; Najāt, 499; Ishārāt, 2, 174–6.
18 Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.1, 14; Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 64–5; 257ff.; Najāt, 190–1.
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is that thematerial cause is a passive principle and associatedwith potentiality
(quwwa), whereas the formal cause is an active principle and associated with
actuality ( fiʿl):
If [the cause of a thing] is included in its constitution and is part of its
existence, then either it must be the part where, in terms of its existence
alone,19 it is not necessary for it to be actual, but only to be in potency,
and is termed ‘matter.’ Or [the causemust be] the part whose existence is
its being in actuality, namely form.20
Given its passivity, however, the material recipient is a principle only acci-
dentally, “because it is first rendered subsistent in act through form, while its
essence, considered only in itself, is in potency.”21
Due to its association with potentiality, primematter does not exist of itself.
It can only exist if it is paired with, and actualised by, the active principle
of form, to which it serves as a recipient (qābil). It can never be divested of
form.22 Prime matter of itself is devoid of actuality also with respect to its
predisposition:
Absolutematter (hayūlāmuṭlaqa) is a substance which exists in actuality
only when it receives corporeal form by virtue of the potentiality it has to
receive forms. Absolute matter does not have in itself any form particular
to it, except potentiality.23
Therefore, prime matter lacks any inherent formal preparedness (istiʿdād),
or positive characteristics and determination, including three-dimensionality
and continuity, divisibility, shape, quantity and position. In other words, actual
corporeity is not a characteristic belonging to matter by predisposition, or
engendered and contributed to body by it. Matter, rather, only has the poten-
tiality to receive contraries, such as continuity and discontinuity, as well as any
accidental shape or quantity.
What invests body with its corporeity—that is, its three-dimensional exten-
sion—is corporeal form, which is the first substantial form impressed into
19 Reading waḥdahu, rather than wa-ḥaddihi (Marmura).
20 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, vi.1, 258 (Marmura, 195, with modifications); cf. 257. On matter and
passivity, see also Belo, Chance and Determinism, 57 ff.
21 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, vi.1, 258 (Marmura, 195).
22 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.3, 72 ff.; Najāt, 502–6; Ishārāt, 2, 202ff.
23 Avicenna, Ḥudūd, 17.
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prime matter. The combination of this form and matter constitutes natural
body. Since the actual realisation of natural body owes entirely to corporeal
form and sincematter only serves as a passive substrate devoid of positive char-
acteristics, all that was previously said of natural body holds true of corporeal
form. It is three-dimensional continuity abstracted frommatter and accidents,
and is the same in all concrete bodies.24
Now, according to Abū l-Barakāt, Avicenna’s theory that prime matter of
itself lacks corporeity rests on a misinterpretation of ancient philosophical
sources, particularly Aristotle, whomaintained that primematter has no inher-
ent magnitude, shape, place, nor any other such characteristics.25 Aristotle, he
opines, only intended thatmatter, of itself, is deprived of determinate, acciden-
tal magnitude, but was taken mistakenly by Avicenna to deny that matter was
characterised by three-dimensional extendedness altogether.
Disputing Avicenna’s view that prime matter lacks existence of itself and
is actualised by form,26 Abū l-Barakāt submits that prime matter (hayūlā ūlā)
is none other than body, and as such inherently corporeal and characterised
by continuous extension (imtidād ittiṣālī). He reasons that by considering how
bodies are analysed (taḥlīl) to their basic constituents both in reality (wujūdī)
and in the mind (dhihnī, fī l-naẓar), it becomes evident that there must be
an underlying corporeal substrate that is common to all concrete bodies and
persists unchanged as they undergo qualitative transmutation:27
Reflection reveals to us things thatwe call ‘matter’ for other things, such as
wood for a bed. Wood too has as its matter things that share its substrate
with it, but differ from it with respect to form. For when wood is burnt,
ash remains and water and air separate. So earth (which is the ash),
water and air are the matter of wood, from which it is composed, and to
which it decomposes. Therefore, each of water, earth and air is a matter
for things that are composed of them, which vary in that they have a
higher proportion of some and a lower proportion of others. Finally, these
[elements] share corporeity ( jismiyya) among them. Body ( jism), hence,
24 Avicenna, Manṭiq, ii.III.4, 113. On corporeal form and its pre-Avicennan roots, see also
Hyman, “Aristotle’s ‘First Matter’ ”; Stone, “Simplicius and Avicenna.”
25 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 2, 12–13; 3, 200–1. Avicenna is not mentioned by name here, but
is clearly intended.
26 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 2, 16; 2, 123–4.
27 Abū l-Barakāt,Muʿtabar, 2, 10–12; 3, 195–6; 3, 202–3. On Avicenna’s notion of ‘analysis,’ see
McGinnis, “Penetrating Question,” 64–5.
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is the prime matter for all; yet body itself does not have an underlying
matter, because we find that it neither is composed of another thing nor
becomes decomposed to another thing.28
The Avicennan thesis that body consists of the combination of an incorporeal
primematter and corporeal form is rejected out of hand on the grounds that it
lacks the support of evidence: “We have not discerned this so-called ‘matter’
in body through perception, nor does it result from decomposition, nor are
we led to accepting it by […] a demonstrative argument.”29 As we shall see a
little later, Abū l-Barakāt also confutes Avicenna’s arguments for the existence
of such matter.
2 Shifāʾ and Najāt Arguments
Avicenna has two arguments to prove that body is a complex of prime matter
and corporeal form: one only appears in the Shifāʾ, and another appears in
different versions in several works, including the Shifāʾ and the Najāt. It is vital
that we start by examining these discussions before interpreting the proof set
out in the Ishārāt, with which we are mainly concerned, to appreciate fully the
points of contention raised by our twelfth-century critics. These, as we shall
see, turn on the question whether the proof starts from genuinely formal, or
merely accidental change.
2.1 The Shifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt ii.2
Two arguments are deployed in the section titled “Ascertaining corporeal sub-
stance and what it is composed of,”30 in the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ, whose
main objective is to demonstrate that body consists of matter and form. In the
first argument, Avicenna adapts the traditionalAristotelianproof of primemat-
ter from change, trading qualitative change for change in continuity. Starting
from the notion that corporeity is divisible, the argument proves that “the form
of body and the dimensions subsist in something (qāʾima fī shayʾ).” It goes as
follows (Sh.1–6):31
28 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 195–6.
29 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 200.
30 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 61 ff. Not ‘and what is composed from it’, as in Marmura’s transla-
tion (48). The section explicitly discusses what body is composed of (Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 67).
31 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 66.
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[1] Dimensions are either the same as instances of continuity (ittiṣālāt)
or something that occurs to continuity, as we shall establish, rather than
a thing to which continuity occurs. [2] For the expression ‘dimensions’ is
a name for the continuous magnitudes themselves, not for the things to
which continuity occurs. [3] The thing which is continuity itself or which
is continuous in itself cannot remain its identical self once continuity
ceases to be.32 [4] For every continuity is a dimension33 that, if it becomes
discontinuous, will cease to be and two other dimensions will come
to be. [5] Likewise, if continuity comes to be—I mean ‘continuity’ in
the sense that it is a differentia, not an accident, as I have explained
elsewhere34—then a new dimension will come to be and all that had its
special characteristic will cease to be.35 [6] Therefore, there is something
in bodies that is the subject (mawḍūʿ) for continuity and discontinuity,
and for the specific magnitudes that occur accidentally to continuity.36
The argument turns on determinate continuity—that is, an instance of con-
tinuity (the plural, ittiṣālāt, is used)—which is inseparably correlated to mag-
nitude (dimension), although, we are told, the exact relation between the two
will be explained elsewhere (Sh.1–2). When a body is divided, its original mag-
nitude will pass away and be replaced with two newmagnitudes, and (because
of the correlation between an instance of continuity and its magnitude) the
original instance of continuity will pass away and be replaced with two new
instances of continuity (Sh.3–4). Likewise, when two bodies combine into one,
their magnitudes will pass away and be replaced with a new magnitude, and
the original instances of continuity will pass away and be replaced with a new
instance of continuity (Sh.5). Since the body’s original determinate continu-
ity passes away when it undergoes division (Sh.4), there must be something in
the body other than its determinate continuity, which serves as the subject for
continuity and discontinuity, and for the specific magnitudes associated with
continuity (Sh.6). The subject in question appears to be matter: it is the thing
in which “the form of body and the dimensions” subsist.37
32 Reading, with Marmura, baṭula, not yaẓallu, as in Anawati and Zāyid’s edition.
33 Reading, with Anawati and Zāyid’s edition, fa-kullu ittiṣālin buʿdun, not fa-kullu ittiṣāli
buʿdin (the connection of every dimension), as in Marmura’s edition (53).
34 That is, continuity in sense 3 (see p. 367 above).
35 Reading wa-ka-dhālika … bi-khāṣṣiyyatihi as a single sentence, without the full stop ap-
pearing in the editions.
36 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 66–7.
37 On the sense in which Avicenna sometimes refers to matter as a ‘subject,’ see Stone,
“Simplicius and Avicenna,” 77–8.
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If this indeed is the conclusion, then the reasoning seems a little suspect. For
whether dimension is the same as an instance of continuity or something that
occurs to continuity (Sh.1), it is accidental to it. This is confirmed in Ilāhiyyāt
iii.4, “On that magnitudes are accidents,” which is the discussion referred to in
Sh.1. The first magnitude discussed in the section is the continuous quantity of
body, “which is the quantity of the continuous [thing] that is body in the sense
of form,” i.e. in the sense of the substantial form of corporeity.38 This accident
of magnitude inheres in the complex of matter and corporeal form: it “attaches
to matter and to something in matter,” i.e. corporeal form, though it is directly
and inseparably associated with the latter, but not with the former, since it can
be conceptually separated from matter, but not from corporeity. Magnitude,
hence, must not be equated with corporeal form:
This magnitude is the continuous [thing]’s being such that it can be
measured (yumsaḥu) so many times by such-and-such [a measurement
unit].39 […] This is different from the thing’s being such that it is suscepti-
ble to the positing of the aforementioned dimensions. For one body does
not differ from another in this respect. […] The [former] notion is the
quantity of the body, whereas the [latter] is its form.40
So, although magnitude and substantive continuity are concomitant, it is not
entirely clear why the passing away of magnitudemust be accompanied by the
passing away of substantive continuity. For it is arguable, as we shall see, that
division only results in change in the accident of magnitude, which inheres
in continuous substance, and consequently that the thing “that is the subject
for continuity and discontinuity, and for the specific magnitudes that occur
accidentally to continuity” (Sh.6) can only be corporeal substance, rather than
prime matter.
Avicenna’s second argument, of little relevance to the present study, goes as
follows.41 With respect to its corporeity, body is a thing in actuality. Body also
has preparedness (mustaʿidd) to receive: “whatever preparedness you wish for
it (ayy istiʿdād shiʾta), it is [a thing] in potentiality.” This, it appears, refers to
body’s preparedness to receive substantial forms (other than corporeity) and
38 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, iii.4, 111.
39 Reading, with Anawati and Zāyid’s edition, bi-kadhā kadhā marra, as opposed to Mar-
mura’s bi-kadhā wa-kadhāmarra. The first kadhā refers to themeasurement unit, and the
second to the number of times.
40 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, iii.4, 111–12.
41 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, ii.2, 67.
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accidents.42 The same simple being, however, cannot be, in one and the same
respect, one thing in actuality and a different thing in potentiality. Therefore,
body must consist of the combination of two components: one that makes it
something in actuality, and another by virtue of which body has the potential-
ity to receive different substantial forms and accidents. These, respectively, are
corporeal formandmatter. This argument is an applicationof theprinciple that
an absolutely simple being cannot serve as two causes: since body cannot be
botha formal cause for its corporeity andamaterial cause for theother substan-
tial forms and accidents it receives, it cannot be simple and non-composite.
2.2 TheNajāt
Avicenna appears to become aware of the shortcomings of his first argument
in the Shifāʾ. So in his later work, the Najāt, the argument is developed into
two separate arguments. The section titled, “On provingmatter and explaining
the essence of corporeal form,” proceeds by defining ‘body’ and then making a
clear-cut distinction between corporeity and magnitude.43 Avicenna explains
that corporeal form and magnitude are analogous in that they do not subsist
in themselves, but must subsist (yaqūmu) in another. Accidents of magnitude
must inhere in a subject, whereas corporeity, as a substantial form, must exist
in the substrate of matter. These two points are substantiated in turn.
The first point, he writes, is obvious. For specific dimensions come into exis-
tence and pass away (tūjadu wa-tuʿdamu) when the shape of the body under-
goes change, yet the subject (mawḍūʿ) remains constant.44 This indicates the
existence of a subject that in itself is not characterised by any specific magni-
tude, but in which multiple accidental specific magnitudes may inhere. The
subject in question is, of course, body. As such, this argument is a much tidier
reinterpretation of the first argument in the Shifāʾ. However, one commentator
on the Najāt, a certain Fakhr al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾīnī (6th/12th c.) who is a tradi-
tional Avicennist, remarks that since this point contributes nothing to proving
the existence of matter, but only reiterates the accidental nature of magnitude
whichhadalreadybeenexplainedearlier in the section, it is a superfluous inter-
polation that serves no purpose (ḥashw lā fāʾida fīhi).45
For the second point, that corporeal form must inhere in matter, Avicenna
argues as follows (hereafter, I will refer to this simply as ‘the Najāt argument’).
42 As the argument is explained by al-Rāzī (Maṭālib, 6, 201–2; cf.Mabāḥith, 2, 44). Avicenna’s
student Bahmanyār gives the reception of colours or motion as examples (Taḥṣīl, 316).
43 Avicenna, Najāt, 498–500.
44 Avicenna, Najāt, 500.
45 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾīnī, Sharḥ al-Najāt, 33.
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Corporeal form is either the same as continuity, or a nature towhich continuity
is concomitant—eitherway, and by the same reasoning, continuitywill require
a substrate.46 Assuming corporeity is the same as continuity (n.1–5),
… [1] body may be continuous and then be divided. [2] So there must
be something that is potentially both [continuous and discontinuous].
[3] Continuity itself, qua continuity, cannot receive discontinuity, [4] for
the recipient of discontinuity must not cease to be when discontinuity
occurs, whereas continuity ceases to be when discontinuity occurs. [5]
Therefore, theremust be something other than continuity which receives
discontinuity and is itself the recipient of continuity.47
This argument is adevelopedversionof the firstShifāʾ argument, but in contrast
makes no reference to accidents of magnitude passing away or coming to be.
What matter receives here are not different instances of quantitative continu-
ity, but simply continuity and discontinuity simpliciter, and the occurrence of
this substantial change in body indicates the presence of a receptive substrate.
2.3 ʿUyūn al-ḥikma
In this other Avicennan work, we find a rather puzzling version of this proof,
which suggests that discontinuity is an existent thing that comes to be:
Corporeal continuity exists inmatter. This is so because it is susceptible to
discontinuity; and its susceptibility to discontinuitymust be due either to
its continuity [or to something else]. However, continuity cannot receive
discontinuity, which is its opposite (ḍidd). For it is inconceivable for the
opposite [of a thing] to possess the potentiality to receive its opposite,
given that the recipient of a thing can only receive it while [the recipient]
exists; for it is inconceivable that a non-existent thing receive an existent
thing (shayʾ mawjūd), and the opposite [of a thing] will cease to be
when its opposite comes to be […]. Therefore, the potentiality to receive
discontinuity belongs to something that receives both discontinuity and
continuity. Therefore, corporeal continuity exists in matter […].48
46 Avicenna, Najāt, 500; cf. Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, 314; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾīnī, Sharḥ al-Najāt,
32. The doubt that Avicenna expresses in this passage has already been discussed by Stone
(“Simplicius and Avicenna,” 101–6) and will not be pursued here.
47 Avicenna, Najāt, 500.
48 Avicenna, ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 48.
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How discontinuity can be an “existent thing” is left unexplained. Otherwise,
the argument is basically the same as the Najāt argument.
3 The Ishārāt Argument
We now turn to the passage targeted by al-Masʿūdī, which appears early in the
first chapter (namaṭ) of the Physics and Metaphysics of the Ishārāt, titled “On
the reality of bodies” (tajawhural-ajsām).49 Thediscussion leading to the ishāra
proceeds as follows:
1. First, Avicenna refutes the theory that bodies consist of minimal, indivisible
parts ( juzʾ), which was current in classical kalām.50
2. He then refutes another version of kalām atomism, namely the theory that
bodies consist of infinitely-divisible parts, propounded by al-Naẓẓām
(d. 220–230/835–845).51
3. From 1 and 2, it follows that bodies consist, not of indivisible parts, but of a
continuum, which is divisible either actually or in thought.52
4. From 3, it follows that bodies are infinitely divisible, at least in thought.53
5. Avicenna then states that he will argue later in the book that motion and
time are likewise continuous and not atomistic, contra classical kalām the-
ologians.54
Having proved that body is continuous and infinitely divisible, Avicenna pro-
ceeds to argue from continuity to establish the central thesis of hylomorphism,
which is that body consists of the complex of matter and form. Here is a trans-
lation of the ishāra in question (i.1–7):
You have come to know [1] that a body has a continuous, three-dimen-
sional magnitude (miqdār thakhīn muttaṣil), and [2] that it is susceptible
to discontinuity (infiṣāl) and fragmentation (infikāk). You also know [3]
that what is continuous in itself (al-muttaṣil bi-dhātihi) is different from
49 On rendering ‘tajawhur’ as ‘reality’ (ḥaqīqa), as opposed to ‘substantiality,’ see al-Rāzī,
Sharḥ, 2, 3–4.
50 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 152–7.
51 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 158–62.
52 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 163–5.
53 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 166.
54 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 167.
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the recipient (qābil) of continuity and discontinuity, whose receptivity
is itself attributed by both [i.e. as receptivity to continuity and disconti-
nuity]. [4] Therefore, the potentiality for this reception is different from
the existence in actuality of that which is received (maqbūl), and differ-
ent from its shape and form (hayʾatuhuwa-ṣūratuhu). [5] This potentiality
belongs to [something] other thanwhat is the same aswhat is continuous
in itself, [6] which at the occurrence of discontinuity passes away, and a
different [thing] comes to be (yūjadu), and [7] the like (mithl) of which
then comes to be anew at the restoration of continuity.55
The conclusion is that body consists of the combination of two distinct things:
one that is continuous in itself, and one that has the potentiality to receive
both continuity anddiscontinuity. In the ensuingdiscussion, Avicenna refers to
these, respectively, as ‘corporeal form’ and ‘matter’; and in a slightly later ishāra,
he confirms this conclusion by cross-referencing this passage as his proof that
body consists of these two principles combined.56
The ishāra is rather abstruse, and needs to be unpacked. It seems, in some
respects, to resonate with the first Shifāʾ argument, and in other respects with
the Najāt version of the argument. Here is an interpretation.
Body is continuous (i.1), and at the same time divisible (i.2). Avicenna intro-
duces the former point by, “You have come to know,” since the notion of
corporeity being a continuum is not self-evident, but has just been demon-
strated in the preceding discussion in the same chapter. By contrast, three-
dimensionality and magnitude, the two other characteristics of body men-
tioned, are self-evident and need no proof.57
Being essentially continuous and being susceptible to both continuity and
discontinuity are two different characteristics of body (i.3).58 Body is suscepti-
ble to continuity and discontinuity on account of its possessing the potentiality
to receive either; and it is continuous on account of its possessing actual con-
tinuity (i.4).59 Thus far, the argument turns on indeterminate continuity: the
55 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 172–3.
56 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 182–3.
57 Cf. al-Ṭūsī’s commentary, Ḥall, 2, 169.
58 Al-Taḥtānī remarks, convincingly, that i.3 is superfluous, since it is repeated in i.4 (Muḥā-
kamāt, 45).
59 Although body is susceptible to receiving either continuity or discontinuity, the argument
only pursues the dichotomy between this susceptibility and body’s actual continuity.
Actual discontinuity is not an essential characteristic of body. So “the existence in actuality
of that which is received” (i.3) refers to continuity alone. After all, having “existence in
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expression ‘what is continuous in itself ’ (i.3), as al-Ṭūsī notes, refers to corpo-
real form.60 So the references that the passage makes to the body’s magnitude
(i.1) and to its shape and mathematical form (i.4), which belong to accidental,
quantitative continuity, appear superfluous. Al-Taḥtānī remarks that i.4 makes
three distinct statements—that the potentiality for continuity and disconti-
nuity is different from continuity, that it is different from the body’s shape, and
that it is different from its magnitude—and that the last two statements have
no business being in the passage at all.61
So, do these two characteristics of body—its actual continuity, and its poten-
tiality for continuity and discontinuity—belong to one and the same simple
substance, or do they belong to two different things, which constitute body?
In the Najāt argument, the former alternative is eliminated on the grounds
that (indeterminate) continuity, which is the essential characteristic of corpor-
eity, passes away at the occurrence of discontinuity, and hence cannot itself
have the potentiality for, and be the recipient to, discontinuity (n.3–4). By con-
trast, however, the argument in i.5–7 shifts to hinge on determinate continuity.
This shift from indeterminate to determinate continuity is signalled, in the
first instance, by the curious phrasing of i.5, “Potentiality belongs to some-
thing other than what is the same as what is continuous in itself” (ghayr mā
huwa dhāt al-muttaṣil bi-dhātihi), as opposed to themore natural, “Potentiality
belongs to somethingother thanwhat is continuous in itself” (ghayral-muttaṣil
bi-dhātihi). The phrasing resonates with the phrasing of the first Shifāʾ argu-
ment, and seems to suggest that determinate continuity is the same as indeter-
minate continuity, which is ‘what is continuous in itself,’ to the extent that the
former is particular and the latter universal (cf. Sh.3). Accordingly, the notion
that body could be a simple being is eliminated in i.5–7 as follows: The thing
that is susceptible to, and that receives, both continuity and discontinuity can-
not be (determinate) continuity itself, because determinate continuity passes
away at the occurrence of discontinuity, and is replaced with different deter-
minate continuities, which ‘come to be’ (yūjadu). Likewise, if these resultant
bodies are recombined into one body, their determinate continuities pass away
actuality” and “shape and [mathematical] form” can only be said of continuity, to the
exclusion of discontinuity.
60 Al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall, 170 (reading, with the edition of the Shifāʾ, miqdār al-muttaṣil, instead of
al-miqdār al-muttaṣil), referring to: Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, iii.4, 111.
61 Al-Taḥtānī, Muḥākamāt, 45. He expresses astonishment at al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī’s failure
to comment on the last two statements. Al-Rāzī remarks on Avicenna’s reference to
magnitude, but does not object to it in his main commentary on the Ishārāt, since it
accords with his own version of the proof, as we shall see (Sharḥ, 2, 31).
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and a new determinate continuity comes to be. Therefore, body is made up of
two different things: actual continuity belongs to one, and is subject to gen-
eration and corruption, and the potentiality for continuity and discontinuity
belongs to the other, which is the substrate for the generation and corruption
of continuity (i.5).62
That i.5–7 turns on determinate continuity, rather than indeterminate con-
tinuity as in the Najāt argument, is confirmed in two further features. First, i.6
asserts that when discontinuity occurs something passes away and a different
thing ‘comes to be’ (yūjadu). This corresponds to the first Shifāʾ argument, in
which, aswehave seen, it is stated thatwhen a body is divided its original deter-
minate continuity passes away and two new determinate continuities come
to be, and when two bodies combine into one their determinate continuities
pass away and a new one comes to be (Sh.3–5). In the Najāt argument, by con-
trast,whencontinuity is lost at theoccurrenceof discontinuity, nothing, strictly
speaking, ‘comes to be’ in its place (n.3–4). Second, i.7 states that if after a body
undergoes division, its parts recombine into one body, the resultant continuity
will be ‘like’ (mithl)—hence, not the same as (nafs)—the original continuity;
and again this indicates that the original and resultant are instances of conti-
nuity (cf. Sh.5).63
4 Al-Masʿūdī’s Criticism
In the first of the fifteen sections of the Shukūk, titled “On proving prime mat-
ter,” al-Masʿūdī initiates the discussion by citing the ishāra in full and then
referring to the slightly later ishāra in which Avicenna cross-references this
passage spelling out precisely its intended, but otherwise unstated, conclu-
sion (gharaḍ), namely that body consists of a complex of matter and corpo-
real form.64 Without further ado, he proceeds to confute the argument on the
grounds that it falls short of achieving its intended goal (lā yafī bi-hādhā l-
gharaḍ). He argues that it is insufficient for proving, as Avicenna claims it does,
that body consists of matter and corporeal form, since it only establishes a
62 The relative clause pronoun, “which” (alladhī), introducing i.6 should be interpreted as
meaning ‘because’. So i.6–7 substantiate i.5. Cf. Avicenna, Najāt (500) and ʿUyūn al-ḥikma
(48), which have “because” (li-anna).
63 This observation is made by al-Rāzī (Sharḥ, 2, 31; Jawābāt, 14; cf. Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, i.5,
36).
64 Al-Masʿūdī, Shukūk, fols. 109b–110a. See n. 56 above.
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much more general point, which is the incontrovertible fact that continuity
and the recipient (qābil) of continuity are not one and the same thing.65
Al-Masʿūdī goes on to argue that, upon further examination, it turns out that
the continuity-and-recipient dichotomy evinced in the argument is not one of
substantial form and prime matter, but merely the dichotomy of magnitude
andbody. For the continuity that passes awayat theoccurrenceof discontinuity
in a body, and that comes to be at the restoration of continuity, is not corporeal
form, but rather continuity as an accident in the category of continuous quan-
tity (ʿaraḍ min bāb al-kammiyya al-muttaṣila), in other words, magnitude. For
when a particular body is divided, what it loses will only be its unity (waḥda)
and magnitude, which are both entirely accidental to it. As to non-accidental
continuity, which is essential to its corporeity, it remains unaltered by such
accidental change, neither coming to be nor passing away. If a given lump of
wax is divided into parts, its unity and magnitude will pass away, and so will
the continuity that had existed between its would-be parts, as new magni-
tudes come to be. Yet each part will be no less a lump of wax, and ipso facto
no less three-dimensional and continuous, than the original body, indicating
that the reality (ḥaqīqa) of the body, quabody, has remainedunaltered. Accord-
ingly, the subject (mawḍūʿ) that serves as the recipient of accidental continuity
and hence undergoes accidental change is not prime matter, but in fact body
itself.
The upshot of al-Masʿūdī’s criticism is that Avicenna’s proof in fact turns
on quantitative accidental change in body, when it needs instead to hinge
on change in substantial form, as it is indeed purported to do. The proof,
consequently, fails to demonstrate that body consists of the combination of
form and matter. For the fact that the corporeity of body is not lost when it
undergoes accidental change of quantity, by the occurrence of discontinuity
therein, indicates that the subsistence of corporeity is engendered by a form
that endures this change. And onemay postulate, for the sake of argument, that
the form in question is none other than the species form (ṣūra nawʿiyya) of any
given body (for instance, the wax form [ṣūrat al-shamʿiyya] of a lump of wax),
and that species form is the reality of body and is a simple, non-composite and
self-subsisting substance, though in actual particular bodies it is inseparably
characterised by accidents of quantity. So the occurrence of division in a given
body would only involve multiplication, change in dimension, and loss of
continuity between would-be parts—all accidental types of change—but no
change in the reality of body. This alternative hypothesis, of course, is not
65 Al-Masʿūdī, Shukūk, fols. 110a–b.
380 shihadeh
Oriens 42 (2014) 364–396
one that al-Masʿūdī wishes to advocate, but is meant only to corroborate his
point that Avicenna’s argument fails to prove that body consists of matter and
form.
Al-Masʿūdī’s criticismmay have been inspired by a reading of the first Shifāʾ
argument, where Avicenna argues along similar lines but explicitly from acci-
dents of dimension, alongside theNajāt discussion,whereAvicennawrites that
change in magnitude only attests the presence of a subject in which accidents
of continuous quantity inhere. However, as al-Rāzī points out in his response,
al-Masʿūdī’s counterargument is more likely co-opted from his older contem-
porary Abū l-Barakāt.66 In his criticism of Avicenna’s theory of corporeal form
included in the section onmatter and form in theMetaphysics of theMuʿtabar,
Abū l-Barakāt argues at length against the first Shifāʾ argument and the sec-
ond Najāt argument. He refers to Avicenna as “an eminent individual” (baʿḍ
al-fuḍalāʾ), without identifying him by name.67 He confutes the former argu-
ment on the grounds that it starts from change in the accident of magnitude,
rather than in corporeity.68 He then turns to the latter, ‘subtle’ argument (ḥujja
daqīqa), targeting the claim that continuity passes away at the occurrence of
discontinuity, which makes no reference to determinate continuity or magni-
tude.69 This claim, he argues, can have two interpretations. First, that the con-
tinuity of the body’s extension (al-ittiṣāl al-imtidādī) passes away completely;
however, this continuity is not lostwith division, and even if the body is divided
ad infinitum continuous parts will survive each instance of division. Second,
that only the continuity between the different would-be parts of the original
body is lost; however, this continuity is only relational, and hence accidental,
since its subject—namely, the would-be parts which become actually separate
parts—remains unchanged with respect to its corporeity, and undergoes nei-
ther generation nor corruption by division:
If [a body] is divided, discontinuity will not make its continuity cease
to be in the way that the form of air makes the form of water cease to
be, so that [the existence of] a thing common to both of them can be
established. Rather, it multiplies it. Yet multiplication is not the same as
passing away.70
66 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 19.
67 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 201.
68 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 196–200.
69 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 201–2.
70 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 202.
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Abū l-Barakāt concludes that ‘continuity’ is an equivocal term that can refer
to either extension or an accidental relation betweenbodies, and that theNajāt
argument fails since it assumes,mistakenly, that the passing away of continuity
in the latter sense amounts to the passing away of continuity in the former
sense.
The influence of Abū l-Barakāt on al-Masʿūdī is further attested in the re-
mainder of the latter’s commentary on the ishāra. This borrowing, again, is
observed by al-Rāzī.71 Having established both that Avicenna’s theory of cor-
poreal form is baseless and that Avicenna fails to prove that body consists of
form and matter, he defends the competing hylomorphism propounded by
Abū l-Barakāt, advancing an alternative proof ofmatter. He introduces this the-
sis as the result of investigation (mā intahā ilayhi l-baḥth). Some bodies, he
reasons, undergo change in their species form (ṣūra nawʿiyya), such that one
essence passes away and is replaced by a different essence that comes to be.
Yet, before and after the change, something remains unchanged in body, nei-
ther passing away nor coming to be. For instance, an egg becomes altered into
a bird, and sperm into an animal. Wheat, when prepared for consumption and
then ingested and digested, is altered into flour, dough, bread, chyle, blood and
finally flesh and bones. In each case, something in body changes, and another
thing, conjoined to it, remains unaltered. The latter is matter. The former is
either form, if the species, i.e. the essence, of the thing is altered, or an acci-
dent, if the species is not altered.72
5 Al-Rāzī’s Defence of Avicenna
Al-Rāzī provides valuable clues as to the nature of what appears to be a heated
and quite partisan debate among his contemporaries (ʿaẓuma taʿaṣṣub al-nās)
over Avicenna’s proof of prime matter and Abū l-Barakāt and al-Masʿūdī’s
objection.73 The argument from body’s susceptibility to continuity and dis-
continuity, he points out, was the standard proof (al-burhān al-mashhūr) of
prime matter among the philosophers of his time.74 It is the proof on which
hylomorphists “rely and with which they stride around (bi-hā yaṣūlūna)!”75
Indeed, the same proof is used, unsurprisingly, in Bahmanyār’s (d. 459/1066)
71 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 19.
72 Al-Masʿūdī, Shukūk, fols. 110b–111a.
73 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 3, 21.
74 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 12.
75 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 201.
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Taḥṣīl and al-Lawkarī’s (d. ca. 517/1123) Bayān al-ḥaqq, and is reproduced in
al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) Maqāṣid al-falāsifa and al-Shahrastānī’s (d. 548/1153)
Milal.76 Al-Rāzī also remarks that Abū l-Barakāt and al-Masʿūdī’s counterar-
gument (iʿtirāḍ) had become widely influential.77 Some may have used it to
promulgate the alternative theory ofmatter proposed by Abū l-Barakāt. Yet the
counterargument was also conveniently adapted by some kalām theologians
in their defence of atomism, such as Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī (d. ca. 590/1194)—
a critic of Avicenna, colleague of al-Masʿūdī and admirer of his Shukūk—who
borrowed it explicitly fromAbū l-Barakāt’sMuʿtabar.78 It is also reproduced by
al-Shahrastānī, who draws on Abū l-Barakāt without naming him.79
This influential line of criticism, however, was brought to an abrupt end by
al-Rāzī,who, despite tending to suspend judgementon thenatureofmatter and
body, nonetheless works out a robust defence of Avicenna’s proof effectively
salvaging it along with the broader theory of corporeal form.80 He does this,
firstly, in his dedicated response to al-Masʿūdī’s Shukūk, which shall be our
main focus in the present section, but then in other philosophical works, most
notably his commentary on the Ishārāt. The proof is developed and defended
along exclusively Avicennan lines. So at one point in the discussion in Sharḥ
al-Ishārāt, al-Rāzī confirms his rejection of one Avicennan view, but explains
that “we must interpret his text in accordance with his own principles (yajibu
ʿalaynā tafsīr kalāmihi ʿalā mā yuṭābiqu uṣūlahu), rather than the principles of
others,” including, that is, the commentator’s views.81
76 Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, 312–18; al-Lawkarī, Bayān, 50–4; al-Ghazālī,Maqāṣid, 2, 16–17; al-Shah-
rastānī, Milal, 366; cf. idem, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 164.
77 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 3, 21.
78 IbnGhaylān al-Balkhī, Ḥudūth al-ʿālam, 123. See also 11; 111; 114, where al-Masʿūdī is praised
and the Shukūk cited. On Ibn Ghaylān, see Shihadeh, “A Post-Ghazālian Critic of Avi-
cenna.”
79 Al-Shahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām, 165. This, he remarks in characteristic fashion, is a
philosopher’s response to another philosopher (as opposed to amutakallim’s response).
80 Al-Rāzī’s suspension of judgement on this question stems from his view that the essence
of body is unknowable (on this view and its background, see Ibrahim, “Essentialism
versus Phenomenalism,” 394ff.; 411–14). In Risālat dhamm ladhdhāt al-dunyā, which he
wrote in the year of his death, al-Rāzī suggests that this problem is insoluble, since
each of atomism and hylomorphism is supported by compelling proofs (see the edition
in my The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 255). However, in some works, he
appears inclined towards atomism on the grounds that even when certainty is absent in
metaphysical questions, one may still affirm the most compelling (awlā, akhlaq) view as
a probable belief (on this, see Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 181 ff.).
81 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 31.
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Notwithstanding his own commitments, al-Rāzī’s elaborate defence is such
an original interpretation of Avicenna’s proof that it may be considered a new
argument. Al-Rāzī himself confirms that the interpretation he sets out is unat-
tested in Avicenna, but is his own original contribution, designed to support
(taqrīr, taṣḥīḥ, nuṣra) Avicenna’s otherwise defective proof. In his commentary
on ʿUyūnal-ḥikma—oneof his laterworks—he summarises al-Masʿūdī’s objec-
tion, and then gives his own defence of the proof, describing it as a method he
“devised so as to substantiate the Shaykh’s proof” (istakhrajtuhu li-taṣḥīḥ dalīl
al-shaykh), in order to “respond to this objection” (yudfaʿu bi-hi hādhā l-suʾāl).82
Yet it is in his last major work, the Maṭālib, that al-Rāzī provides his fullest
recollection of the sequence of events, so to speak: (1) he cites Avicenna’s argu-
ment from body’s susceptibility to continuity and discontinuity, and (2) Abū
l-Barakāt and al-Masʿūdī’s objection (without naming them), (3) he remarks
that the objection is sound, (4) he reportedly confronted certain philosophers
(i.e. traditional Avicennists) with the objection, but received no satisfactory
response, (5) he cites two responses attempted by the philosophers, both of
which he finds “weak,” and (6) he advances his own response on the philoso-
phers’ behalf (lakhkhaṣnāhu li-l-qawm), in the form of a developed version of
Avicenna’s argument.83 Apart from this developed proof, al-Rāzī devises three
other proofs for prime matter on behalf of hylomorphists (takallafnāhā li-l-
qawm), two of which he considers to be superior to the two proofs put forth
by Avicenna (aḥsan min kull mā dhakarūhu). These, however, go well beyond
our present purview and shall not be pursued here.84
That al-Rāzī shoulddefend,with such remarkable conscientiousness, a proof
for a view that he himself rejects must come as no surprise, as it is perfectly
in keeping with his unique modus operandi. He writes in the introduction of
Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl, his theologicalmagnum opus, that he has committed himself,
when treating any given problem, to following the difficult path of exhaus-
tive and in-depth investigation (istiqṣāʾ wa-taʿammuq), which starts by taking
full account of all relevant views and the most cogent arguments adduced by
their exponents, and counterarguments adduced by opponents, and then sup-
porting these views, to the maximum extent possible, with arguments that
82 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 3, 21. He says the same of a different interpretation he
gives for the same proof: takallaftuhu fī nuṣrat dalīl al-shaykh (Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 3,
22).
83 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 201; 205–9. In most occurrences in al-Rāzī’s works, ‘lakhkhaṣa’ should
be rendered as ‘to set out,’ or ‘to expound,’ rather than ‘to abridge,’ or ‘to summarise.’ Cf.
Mabāḥith, 2, 42, where ‘lakhkhaṣa’ is replaced with ‘ḥarrara.’
84 Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 6, 202–4; 209–10; Mabāḥith, 2, 50–3.
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he himself devises on their exponents’ behalf, before proceeding to subject
all views and arguments to systematic criticism. Some exponents, he boasts,
may even find his exposition of their own teachings of greater benefit than
their own school sources.85 The objective of this procedure is simply to arrive
at knowledge soundly through systematic, critical and, in principle, unbiased
enquiry.
Al-Rāzī initiates his response to al-Masʿūdī’s counterargument by establish-
ing two key premises. First, corporeity is different from continuous quantity;
for if a body is reshaped, itsmagnitudes change but its corporeity remains unal-
tered.86 Second, if a thing loses its ipseity (huwiyya), or its haecceity (khuṣūṣiy-
ya), which underpins an individual thing’s (shakhṣ) determinate existence
(taʿayyun) and its differentiation (imtiyāz) from other individual things, the
thing will pass away. For our conception of an individual human being, Zayd,
consists of the combination (majmūʿ) of the abstract conception ‘human be-
ing’—i.e. the thing’s quiddity (māhiyya)—and additional, individuating speci-
ficities (qayd) bywhich Zayd is configured, andwhichmake him this individual
human being. So if an individual thing loses some of the individuating speci-
ficities particular to it, it will cease to exist as the individual thing it is, even if
the new thing that subsequently comes to be still has the same species as the
original thing.87
On the basis of this second premise, al-Rāzī goes on to identify the thing’s
determinate existence and haecceity with its unity (waḥda). To say that a thing
x has concrete, determinate existence implies that it has haecceity on account
of which ‘x’ cannot be said of multiple things. It follows that when body x
is divided into two things and loses its unity, it will also lose its individual
existence—x will cease to exist—as two other bodies come to be. Or, as al-
Rāzī also writes, the original determinate corporeity (al-jismiyya al-muʿayyana,
al-jismiyya al-wāḥida) will pass away, to be succeeded by two newly-generated
determinate corporeities ( jismiyyatān).88
The key conceptual shift that al-Rāzī introduces here is that he trades ‘con-
tinuity,’ which is associated with magnitude, for ‘corporeity’ ( jismiyya), and
that he uses ‘jismiyya’ in a particular, rather than a universal, sense. For Avi-
cenna, this term—often combined with ‘form,’ either as ‘ṣūrat al-jismiyya’ or
85 Al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl, fols. 1b–2a; cf. Shihadeh, “From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī,” 168–9.
86 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 12–13.
87 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 13; Sharḥ, 2, 25–32. On individuation, see idem,Mabāḥith, 1, 74–8. On the
term ‘huwiyya,’ see Bertolacci, “SomeTexts,” 27ff., where references to other treatments are
provided.
88 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 13–14; cf. Sharḥ, 2, 25–8.
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‘al-ṣūra al-jismiyya’—denotes indeterminate formal ‘corporeity,’ that is, the
three-dimensional continuity that is the characteristic form of body. So it is
an unquantifiable noun: Avicenna does not speak of multiple ‘corporeities.’89
This is exactly the sense in which al-Masʿūdī uses the term. For al-Rāzī, how-
ever, ‘jismiyya,’ rendered here as ‘determinate corporeity,’ can also denote an
instance of corporeity, in other words, a concrete and determinate individual
thing qua body: this concrete corporeal entity. This sense, which is unattested
inAvicenna, enables al-Rāzī to speak of one, twoormore concrete ‘determinate
corporeities’ ( jismiyya muʿayyana).
Now, the original determinate corporeity (the body-entity) and subsequent
determinate corporeities are all possible (mumkin). Before the body is divided,
the former will exist but be susceptible to passing away, whereas the latter will
be nonexistent but possible of existence. It follows that these possibilities—the
possibility of passing away of one determinate corporeity and the possibility of
coming to be of another determinate corporeity—require a substrate (maḥall).
(The last view—that possibility must inhere in a substrate—is an Avicennan
doctrine that al-Rāzī himself rejects, as he confirms in Sharḥ al-Ishārāt.)90
This substrate cannot be continuity itself; for what has the potentiality for the
passing away of one thing and the coming to be of another must continue to
exist after the former has passed away and the latter has come to be, whereas
continuity ceases to be with the passing away of the original determinate
corporeity. Therefore, the substrate—matter—must be other than continuity
itself, and must exist before and after the body is divided.
Having set out his defence, al-Rāzī remarks that the proof hinges on one key
principle, namely that a determinate corporeity is susceptible to passing away,
and all that is susceptible to passing away must be enmattered. (This same
principle, he adds, is applied todemonstrate the indestructibility of the rational
soul on the grounds that it is immaterial.) Accordingly, the central point of
contention lies in al-Masʿūdī’s claim that the change that body undergoes with
division is purely accidental:
The esteemed objector (al-fāḍil al-muʿtariḍ) asserts: “What passes away
is an accident in the category of continuous quantity, and its recipient
subject is body.” If hemeans by this thatmagnitude passes away, then this
89 There is, however, one place where he gets very close to that: Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.3, 28;
cf. pp. 388–9 below.
90 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 14; cf. Sharḥ, 2, 31. This Avicennan view is refuted in Sharḥ, 2, 405–8. On
this view, see McGinnis, Avicenna, 182 ff.
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is correct. If, however, hemeans thatmagnitude iswhat passes away, then
this is not the case.91
Although al-Rāzī is satisfied that his own version of the proof is immune to
al-Masʿūdī’s criticism, he proceeds with a detailed rebuttal starting with this
last contention, to show where his contemporary has gone awry.
Al-Rāzī first argues that when a body is divided, it loses its unity and contin-
uous quantity. Now, either the unity of the body’s continuous quantity is the
same as its continuous quantity, or it is other than continuous quantity, but
is such that its passing away causes the passing away of the body’s continu-
ous quantity. However, unity cannot be the same as continuous quantity, since
oneness does not fall under the category of quantity, as indeed is evident in
the fact that oneness is said of separate, immaterial things that are entirely free
frommagnitudes.92 It follows that the unity of the body’s continuous quantity
is entirely distinct from the continuous quantity itself. This shows that, besides
continuous quantity, the body also loses unity with division. Al-Rāzī goes on
to argue that al-Masʿūdī must accordingly concede that the loss of the unity of
continuous quantity causes the loss of continuous quantity itself; yet he gain-
says this by his denial that the loss of the unity of a determinate corporeity
causes the passing away of the determinate corporeity itself.93
Against the same claim that only magnitude, to the exclusion of corporeity,
is lost when body is divided, al-Rāzī deploys the following ad hominem (ex
concessis) argument (ilzām). He argues that if it is conceded, for the sake
of argument, that the jismiyya (by which he clearly intends a determinate
corporeity, rather than indeterminate corporeity) does not pass away with
division, then we must concede that magnitude likewise does not pass away
with division, but merely becomes distributed among the different resulting
parts of the body. What is lost when a body is divided, accordingly, would
be its unity, rather than magnitude. Therefore, since al-Masʿūdī accepts that
when the body loses its unity it consequently loses its magnitude, he must
correspondingly concede the general principle that when a thing loses its unity
the thing itself passes away, and ergo that when the body loses its unity the
determinate corporeity passes away.94
91 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 14.
92 On this, see Avicenna, Shifāʾ, Manṭiq, ii.II.4, 70ff. Al-Rāzī writes that oneness is not a
quantity by essence. On the distinction between quantity by essence and quantity by
accident, see Shifāʾ, Manṭiq, ii.IV.1, 127 ff.
93 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 15.
94 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 15.
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Asmentioned, al-Rāzī’s argument rests on the shift he introduces in the cen-
tral term ‘jismiyya.’ To some extent, the underlying dichotomy between inde-
terminate and determinate corporeity parallels the dichotomywe encounter in
Avicenna’s discussions, examined above, between indeterminate and determi-
nate continuity. The advantage that al-Rāzī’s proof offers is that it turns on the
concept of unity: determinate corporeity is inseparably tied to the body’s unity,
such that if the body is divided, the original determinate corporeity passes
away and new ones come to be. Yet, unlike determinate continuity, deter-
minate corporeity is independent of magnitude, and hence unambiguously
non-accidental. So when body is divided, the original determinate corporeity
(not merely determinate continuity) passes away, and real and non-accidental
things, namely new determinate corporeities (not merely discontinuity and
newmagnitudes) come to be.
As mentioned earlier, al-Rāzī acknowledges the fact that Avicenna’s proof is
deficient, not merely in its manner of presentation, but more substantively in
that it fails to hinge on the most pertinent type of change that body undergoes
when it is divided. So, as pointed out already, he highlights the originality of
his interpretation of the proof. Nonetheless, he is also careful, as any good
commentator would be, to emphasise its overall faithfulness by underscoring
its Avicennan credentials, “so that no one would claim that what I have set out
is not a view of” Avicenna himself.95 Al-Rāzī opines that although Avicenna
does not explicitly formulate his proof such that it turns on the notion of
determinate corporeity, he strongly implies that. For in the Ishārāt proof (i.7),
he states that if a body is divided, and if the parts then become conjoined, the
resultant will be similar to (mithl), and by implication not the same as, the
original: this suggests that he intends the original and resultant determinate
corporeities, rather than mere indeterminate continuity. Al-Rāzī supports his
reading by more explicit evidence attested, as he says, in Bahmanyār’s Taḥṣīl
and in several places in Avicenna’sMubāḥathāt.96 He cites one discussion from
the latter source, in which Bahmanyār writes, in the course of a question sent
to his teacher Avicenna, that a body possesses unity as a concrete individual
thing (waḥda shakhṣiyya), by which it is differentiated (mutamayyiz) from all
95 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 14–15.
96 Bahmanyār reportedly maintains that if a body is divided, and if the parts are then
recombined into one body, the resultant body will not be the same as the original body
itself, but a replica (mithl) of it. I have not found this particular point in the Taḥṣīl, though
admittedly I did not look through the entire work and the point may be found in a less
obvious place. The more general notion that a thing that passes away cannot ‘return’ into
existence is already made by Avicenna (see n. 63 above; cf. Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, 290).
388 shihadeh
Oriens 42 (2014) 364–396
other concrete things in the world ( fī l-ʿālam), including things of the same
genus, and that dividing97 a body will make this unity cease to be. A case in
point given by Bahmanyār is a still body of water contained in a vessel, which
is a concrete individual thing (shakhṣ).When it is divided into different vessels,
the original concrete individual thing will pass away and multiple concrete
individual things will come to be.98 When these separate bodies of water are
then recombined into one vessel, the resultant body of water will be a new
concrete individual thing, different from (ghayr) both the original body of
water and the divided bodies of water (again, cf. i.7). Al-Rāzī remarks that
Avicenna’s response betrays an implicit acceptance of Bahmanyār’s point, and
hence confirms that to his mind, “the determinate corporeity that exists prior
to division passes away at the occurrence of division.”99 The same example of
a body of water being divided and recombined appears (without reference to
Bahmanyār or the Mubāḥathāt) in Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, but with the term “unity
as a concrete individual thing” (waḥda shakhṣiyya) replaced with “individual
determinate corporeity” ( jismiyya wāḥida).100
There is, however, a further discussion that may have inspired al-Rāzī to
develop his new argument, and that may confirm his interpretation. In the
Physics of the Shifāʾ, Avicenna briefly raises the question of whether or not
the corporeal form, common to all natural things, is subject to generation and
corruption.When a body undergoes substantial change (as, for instance, when
water is altered into air), does the corporeal form that existed in the body
before this alteration remain unchanged after it,101 or is the corporeal form
corrupted and replaced with “some other corporeity different in number but
97 Bahmanyārwrites “division or reshaping” (reading tashkīl instead of tashkīk [Mubāḥathāt,
165, l. 7]). Al-Rāzī’s direct quotation omits ‘or reshaping,’ since the alteration of a body’s
shape does not affect its unity ( Jawābāt, 15). And indeed the one example given by
Bahmanyār involves division, and not simply reshaping.
98 Omitting mujtamiʿ (Mubāḥathāt, 165, l. 10), in accordance with some manuscript copies
and al-Rāzī’s Jawābāt.
99 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 15; Avicenna, Mubāḥathāt, 165. Bahmanyār’s point is actually that a
thing’s individual unity, in one respect (min jiha), passes away as a consequence of divi-
sion, but in another respect does not pass away with division, since the body of water
divided and then combined remains, in one respect, the same body of water. Al-Rāzī is
only interested here in the former observation.
100 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 31.
101 Reading fa-yakūnu li-l-ajsām mabdaʾ ṣūrī …, in the singular and without baʿd (hence,
bodies will have one formal principle that is common to them all, and over and above
that different formal principles that are specific to each of them); cf. Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.3, 28,
ll. 9–10 (22, ll. 14–15, in Saʿīd Zāyid’s [Cairo] edition).
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similar in kind”?102 Avicenna refers us to another, unspecified place for an
answer, but appears to be of the latter view—this problem, in any case, goes
beyond our present scope.103 If we disregard the qualitative alteration that the
body is posited to undergo, it is noteworthy that Avicenna here proposes that
when a body undergoes division its original corporeal form may be corrupted
and replaced with multiple corporeal forms.104 This would certainly tally with
al-Rāzī’s interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of corporeal form, as we have seen.
Following his interpretation of Avicenna’s proof, al-Rāzī addresses al-Masʿū-
dī’s aforementioned hypothesis, postulated for the sake of argument, that the
reality of body is its species form, and that species form is a non-composite and
self-subsisting substance. This, he replies, raises an entirely different and unre-
latedproblem, namelywhether or not bodymust possess species formover and
above corporeal form,which is addressed elsewhere in the Ishārāt.105 Nonethe-
less, he goes on to offer a detailed response, which goes beyond our present
scope.106
Al-Rāzī also contests the alternative theory of prime matter adopted by al-
Masʿūdī from Abū l-Barakāt, with which he expostulates by making a standard
Aristotelian point. The cases attested by al-Masʿūdī are all composite bodies
turning into different composite bodies: an egg turns into a bird, sperm turns
into an animal, and wheat turns into bread and ultimately flesh and bones.
None of these cases of qualitative change, however, can evidence the view that
body consists of the combination of prime matter, which is of itself corporeal,
102 Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.3, 28 (McGinnis’s translation, with a slight adjustment).
103 Avicenna,Manṭiq, v.i.10, 99–102; cf. Stone, “Simplicius andAvicenna,” 99–101. Bahmanyār’s
position is stated clearly: “It becomes clear that the corporeal form of bodies on which
natural forms alternate cannot remain one. Otherwise, natural forms would be accidents.
Likewise, matter cannot be made subsistent [first] by the corporeal form singly, and
[second] by the natural form singly; for we will show that one simple matter cannot be
made subsistent by two forms. Rather, the corporeal form is first made subsistent by the
natural form, so that the corporeal form acquires a specific species (tatanawwaʿu); and it
will then make matter subsistent. Body is a third thing that is combined of these three
components to become one in act, and not only hypothetically” (Taḥṣīl, 337–8).
104 Avicenna does not explain how multiple bodies occur when water turns into air. One
reading is that while a body of water is turning into air, it is partly still water, and partly
altered into air. The wording of Avicenna’s text seems to lend some credence to this
reading: “the corporeal form that is in water, for example, when it undergoes alteration
into air, remains itself in the water” (Ṭabīʿiyyāt, i.i.3, 28; my translation). That said, I
wonder whether this should be, “… remains itself in the air” (al-hawāʾ, rather than al-māʾ).
105 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 16; cf. Avicenna, Ishārāt, 2, 208ff.
106 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 16–17.
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and species form, unless a further proposition is demonstrated, namely that
the elements are essentially distinct from, and additional to (maʿnā zāʾid ʿalā),
matter as the underlying ingredients of the composite things that are generated
and corrupted. Yet to prove this proposition, onemust first refute the theory of
mixture (khalīṭ) proposed by the Pre-Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras.107 This
is the theory that bodies do not consist of combinations of a small number of
primitive elements, but rather of a great number of essentially-distinct parts,
qualitatively corresponding to perceptible bodies and irreducible to more
primitive ingredients, such as parts of flesh, bone and bread. These are not
susceptible in themselves to genuine qualitative transmutation: parts of one
kind are never generated from, or corrupted into, a different kind. Percepti-
ble qualitative change undergone by bodies is explained rather by the notion
that every body consists of a mixture of all these types of basic ingredients,
which lie in latency (kumūn) therein, and that a body appears to change qual-
itatively when the proportion of one ingredient increases to the extent that
it becomes apparent (ẓuhūr).108 Al-Rāzī’s reference to Anaxagoras should be
read as a broader allusion to the strain of physical theories, including those
that sprang in early Muʿtazilism, according to which matter is inhomogeneous
and qualitative difference among bodies is explained, either in part or full, in
terms of qualitatively-different primitive classes of matter, rather than in terms
of accidents.109
Al-Masʿūdī neither refutes Anaxagoras’s theory nor comments on the rela-
tionbetween the elements andmatter, andhence, al-Rāzī argues, is not entitled
to maintain that the composite things that come to be and pass away con-
sist of four underlying elements that exist in a substrate of prime matter. Nor
does he rule out the standard kalām theory that the things that come to be
and pass away are accidents that inhere in a self-subsisting material substrate,
as opposed to forms that contribute to rendering their substrate subsistent
(taqwīm). Al-Rāzī concludes his brief response to al-Masʿūdī’s alternative the-
ory and proof of prime matter, and the section as a whole, by stating that “it
is clear that this line of reasoning needs to be bolstered by numerous things
107 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 19–20.
108 For al-Rāzī’s own brief report of Anaxagoras’s theory, see his Muḥaṣṣal, 278–9. For an
overview of the Arabic reception of Anaxagoras, with references to relevant primary and
secondary sources, see Baffioni, “Anaximène, Anaximandre, Anaxagore etDémocrite dans
la tradition arabe.”
109 The prime example in early Muʿtazilism is al-Naẓẓām (d. 230/845), on whose theory see
van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 3, 331 ff.
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before it yields any of the views that we mentioned.”110 A rather polite way of
saying that al-Masʿūdī is a dilettante.
Although, as we have seen so far, al-Rāzī develops what he considers to be
a new version of Avicenna’s proof, and defends it against Abū l-Barakāt and
al-Masʿūdī’s objection, he raises his own objection against this new version of
the proof. Briefly put, the objection applies the same argument to the unity
and division of matter: an individual body has one parcel of matter, and if it is
divided this parcel of matter will pass away and two new parcels of matter will
come to be; therefore, the original parcel of matter must exist in a substrate;
and each substrate, by the same reasoning, will require another substrate, ad
infinitum.111 Al-Rāzī presents this objection briefly in the Jawābāt and remarks,
“This is a difficult problem; and it can only be resolved by means of a subtle
principle, which we are unable to discuss in this epistle” (because it goes
beyond the scope of the work, which is to evaluate the objections raised by
al-Masʿūdī). What this principle is remains a mystery, since in later works,
including theMabāḥith, theMulakhkhaṣ and Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, al-Rāzī presents
this objection as his final word, which shows that, despite his best efforts,
Avicenna’s proof is unsalvageable.112 He even goes further and deals a further
blow to the proof by arguing that a body does not pass away when divided, for
otherwisewhen amosquito sipswith the tip of its “needle” aminiscule quantity
ofwater from the surface of an ocean, the entire oceanwill pass away and a new
ocean will come to be, which is an absurd notion!113 This objection, however,
does not feature in the Jawābāt, where al-Rāzī appears to treat his new version
of Avicenna’s proof as defensible, albeit with considerable difficulty. Alongside
this developed version, he proposes a completely new proof for prime matter,
one that he describes as a “conclusive demonstration” (burhān qāṭiʿ) and as
the “most reliable” proof (al-muʿtamad).114 This proof, which in later works
he considers unsound since it starts from a false (Avicennan) premise, goes
beyond the scope of our present study.115
110 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 20.
111 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 17. For amore detailed presentation of this objection, on the basis of the
discussion in Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, see Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ.”
112 Al-Rāzī, Mabāḥith, 2, 43–4; Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 178a; Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, 26–7; cf. Shihadeh,
“Al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ.”
113 Al-Rāzī, Mulakhkhaṣ, fols. 176a; 178a; cf. Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 3, 21–2; Maṭālib, 6, 206–7.
114 Al-Rāzī, Jawābāt, 17–19; cf. Mabāḥith, 2, 45–7; Mulakhkhaṣ, fol. 177b; Maṭālib, 6, 203;
210.
115 This is one of the three aforementioned new proofs that al-Rāzī develops (see p. 383
above).
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This early debate surrounding corporeal form and the soundness of Avi-
cenna’s proof promptly found its way into the philosophical canon, most nota-
bly in the long tradition of commentaries on the Ishārāt but also in non-
commentarial texts. The figure of al-Masʿūdī lapses into obscurity and is most
likely never identified by name in post-Rāzian treatments of this problem. In
his influential Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, al-Rāzī begins by giving a faithful and concise
exposition (tafsīr) of Avicenna’s original proof, beforementioning an objection
(shakk), namely that the change that body undergoes with division is purely
accidental.116 He introduces his response as follows:
Know that this objection can only be solved if the demonstration is expli-
cated in its better-formulated version (al-wajh al-mulakhkhaṣ),117 which
is to say: When body undergoes division, the determinate corporeity that
exists therein passes away, and two other determinate corporeities come
to be; since this is the case, a determinate corporeity must exist in a sub-
strate.118
He then substantiates each premise and defends his version of the argument
in the vein of what he does in the Jawābāt,119 before turning to a sentence-
by-sentence exposition of Avicenna’s text.120 This exposition, however, reflects
al-Rāzī’s own version of the proof, rather than Avicenna’s.
Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī’s (d. 631/1233) Kashf al-tamwīhāt, the earliest super-
commentary on al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ, mentions the objection cited but ignores al-
Rāzī’s solution, and instead defends Avicenna’s original version of the proof.121
However, al-Ṭūsī, who had access to al-Rāzī’s response to al-Masʿūdī, tries to
steer close to Avicenna’s original proof, but nonetheless exhibits a palpable
Rāzian influence. Although he does not incorporate al-Rāzī’s sense of ‘jismiyya,’
he subtly shifts the proof so that it hinges on the individuation (taʿayyun,
tashakhkhuṣ) of the body qua continuous object,122 and he appeals to the term
“ipseity qua continuous object” (huwiyya ittiṣāliyya,huwiyya imtidādiyya).123 By
116 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 25; cf. Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s Sharḥ.”
117 On the sense of ‘mulakhkhaṣ’ here, see n. 83 above.
118 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 25.
119 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 25–8.
120 Al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 28–31.
121 Al-Āmidī, Kashf al-tamwīhāt, fols. 48b–49a.
122 Al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall, 2, 172.
123 Al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall, 2, 174; 2, 171.
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the time of later commentators on the Ishārāt, such as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī
(d. 766/1364) and Mīrzā Jān al-Bāghnawī (d. 995/1587), al-Rāzī’s version had
become the standard way of interpreting Avicenna’s proof, despite the fact
that, in the final analysis, al-Rāzī himself considers it unsound. A case in
point is that commenting on i.1–2, al-Taḥtānī writes that if body undergoes
division, its ipseity qua continuous object will pass away and be replaced by
two such ipseities, and on i.3–4 that “when division occurs what is received is
not discontinuity itself, since it is nonexistent and what is nonexistent cannot
be received; what is received in reality, rather, are the two newly-generated
determinate corporeities.”124
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